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Abstract 
We analyse a newspaper market where two editors compete for advertising as 
well as for readership. They first choose the political position of their newspaper, then 
set cover prices and advertising tariffs. We build on the work of Gabszewicz, Laussel 
and Sonnac (2001, 2002), whose model we take as the stage game of an infinitely 
repeated game, and investigate the incentives to collude and the properties of the 
collusive agreements in terms of welfare and pluralism. We analyse and compare two 
forms of collusion: in the first, publishers cooperatively select both prices and political 
position; in the second, publishers cooperatively select prices only. Whereas the first 
leads to intermediate product differentiation, the second leads, as in Gabszewicz, 
Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002), to minimal product differentiation. However, in the 
latter case, differently from Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002), cover prices 
are positive and the minimal differentiation outcome does not depend on the size of the 
advertising market. We thus show that collusion on prices reinforces the tendency 
towards a Pensée Unique discussed in Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001).  
JEL classification: L41, L82, D43, K21 
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1. Introduction 
Media industries are well known examples of two sided markets.1 Newspaper 
publishers sell their products to two different categories of buyers, namely readers and 
advertisers. Readers are interested in news while advertisers aim at reaching potential 
consumers by buying advertising space in the newspaper. Newspaper publishers know 
that the more readers their newspaper has the higher the willingness to pay of 
advertisers for a slot in the newspaper. Vice versa readers may be affected by 
advertising in the newspaper.2 Publishers therefore choose cover prices and advertising 
tariffs taking into account this link between the demands on the two sides of the market. 
Yet, differently from the case of complement products, this interdependency among the 
two demands and the resulting link between prices is not recognised by advertisers or 
readers as they buy only one of the two products sold by the publisher.  
Whereas this particular characteristic of media markets has always been known 
to those working in the field and has thus been recognised in the economic literature 
ever since the first studies of these industries3, the literature on two-sided markets 
itself has developed only in the last ten years, as economists became aware of the fact 
that other, apparently very different, markets share this basic features with media 
markets.4 It is the case for instance of payment cards, auction houses and game-
consoles. 
                                                        
1 See Anderson and Gabszewicz (2008) on media markets as two-sided markets. 
2 Whether and to what extent readers/viewers/listeners are instead negatively or positively affected by 
the amount (or concentration) of advertising in a given media is a debated issue. Some theoretical models 
assume that consumers are advertising-averse, e.g. Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2004), Kind, Nillssen 
and Sorgard (2007) and Peitz and Valletti (2008) for the TV industry. Others specify a (variable) 
proportion between ad-lovers and ad-haters, e.g. Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2005) for the press 
industry. Yet other models assume that consumers are advertising indifferent, e.g. Gabszewicz, Laussel 
and Sonnac (2001, 2002) for newspapers, or advertising-lovers, e.g. Gabszewicz, Garella and Sonnac 
(2007) again for newspapers.  
3 See already Corden (1953) and Reddaway (1963). More recently, but still before the theory of two-sided 
markets was developed, Blair and Romano (1993) and Chaundri (1998).  
4 The seminal papers in the field are those by Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 
2006), Evans (2003), Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), and Armstrong (2006). More recently,Weyl(2010) 
proposed a new way to model firms pricing in two-sided markets. Whereas Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 
2003) and Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) respectively talk about indirect network effects and two-sided 
network effects, the term two-sided market appears to have been used first by Rochet and Tirole (2002, 
2003, 2006) as well as Armstrong (2006). Evans (2003) instead, preferred to talk about markets with 
two-sided platforms. In the media literature, Chaundri (1998) talks about “duality in the product space” 
of a newspaper publisher, as the publisher serves both advertisers and readers. Gabszewicz, Laussel and 
Sonnac (2001, 2002) discuss instead cross-market network effects. See Evans and Schmalensee (2007) 
for an overview of different types of two-sided markets and Filistrucchi (2010) for a discussion of how 
many markets are two-sided. 
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The issue of concentration in media markets has been debated both in academic 
circles as well as among policy makers since at least the 1960’s. On the one hand the 
debate centred on the reasons why a high concentration has often been observed in the 
industry5, on the other hand it focused on whether high concentration in the market is 
detrimental to pluralism, i.e. on whether high concentration leads to duplication of 
content or, on the contrary, higher product differentiation.6 With regard to the latter 
question, results are somewhat ambiguous but surprisingly it has been shown that 
competition can lead to duplication of content when media outlets are mainly financed 
through advertising.7 
Despite the fears of a possible lack of pluralism in the media due to high 
concentration in the market, not the same attention has been devoted to the possible 
effects of collusion. Yet in principle joint profit maximization by colluding publishers is 
able to reproduce the same market outcome of a merger among those same publishers. 
On the contrary, the US Newspaper Preservation Act allowed so-called joint 
operating agreements, which permitted newspapers within the same market area to 
jointly set cover prices and advertising rates. Hence, under a JOA newspapers would 
appear to be able to collude on both sides of the market.8 The idea behind this block-
exemption was to help newspapers to survive, given the trend of market exit initiated 
by the appearance of radio and continued with the introduction of TV. 
Also in the academia relatively little attention has been paid to the topic of 
collusion in media markets. More generally, despite the rapid growth of the literature 
on two-sided markets, only very recently the issue of collusion has been investigated in 
empirical as well as in theoretical works and the literature on the topic is still scarce. 
Rhumer (2010) shows how in two-sided markets the presence of indirect 
network externalities affects the incentives to collude and the welfare implications of 
                                                        
5 See Reddaway (1963) and Rosse (1967), Rosse, Owen and Dertouzos (1975), Rosse (1977), Rosse 
(1978), Rosse (1980) and Bucklin, Caves and Lo (1989) for studies, which highlight the importance of 
economies of scale. See instead Gabszewicz, Garella and Sonnac (2007) and Häckner and Nyberg (2008) 
for the role played by the indirect network effects.   
6 See Polo (2007) for a discussion.  
7 See Steiner (1952) for the radio industry and both Beebe (1977) and Spence and Owen (1977) for the 
TV industry. More recently, see Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002) for the newspaper industry 
and Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2004) for the TV industry. See Anderson and Coate (2005) for why 
the relationship between competition and the amount of different programming is ambiguous. 
8 Note that indeed, Fan (2010) models newspapers engaged in JOAs as cooperatively setting cover prices 
and advertising tariffs.  
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collusion. She uses the single-homing model in Armstrong (2006) as a stage game of an 
infinitely repeated game to model a two-sided market where firms are differentiated on 
both sides and simultaneously choose both prices. Assuming firms adopt grim trigger 
strategies she finds that higher network externalities have two opposite effects: on the 
one hand they tend to raise incentives to collude as they increase the gain from 
collusion (collusive profits increase and competitive profits decline); whilst on the other 
hand they tend to lower incentives to collude as they increase the gain from deviation. 
In her model the latter effect is always found to dominate. As a result, collusion becomes 
harder to sustain as indirect network effects between the two sides of the market 
increase. Furthermore, she finds that a higher asymmetry in the indirect network effects 
reduces the incentives to collude. 
Dewenter, Haucap and Wenzel (2010) analyse instead the welfare consequence 
of collusion on the advertising tariffs only in a duopoly newspaper market where firms 
first choose the advertising quantity and then the cover prices, while readers dislike 
advertising. Under these assumptions and the additional assumption of a linear demand 
for differentiated products, they find that collusion on the advertising tariffs may not 
only lead to an increase in readers’ welfare (since it may reduce readers’ prices more 
than it reduces the value of the newspaper to readers by decreasing the quantity of ads) 
but it can also lead to a higher advertiser welfare (as it increases advertising tariffs less 
than it increases the newspaper’s value to advertisers due to higher circulation). 
Most recently, Boffa and Filistrucchi (2011) discuss an interesting particular case 
in which firms in a two-sided market raise prices above the monopoly price on one side 
of the market in order to be able to sustain collusion when perfect joint profit 
maximization is not sustainable.  
In all these theoretical works however product differentiation is exogenous.  
Among empirical works, Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) provide econometric 
evidence that daily newspapers in Italy have been colluding on the cover price (but not 
on the advertising tariffs). They do not address however the issue of whether collusion 
affected the political position of newspapers. 
Whereas the issue of endogenous product positioning in two-sided markets is 
per se interesting, concerns about pluralism imply that product differentiation plays a 
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much more crucial role in media markets than in standard markets, at least in as much 
as pluralism plays the role of a positive externality in the political process.9 
Indeed, Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002) develop a model of 
oligopolistic competition among publishers who choose first political position, then 
cover prices and advertising tariffs. They show that advertising financing can lead to 
minimum product differentiation. Behringer and Filistrucchi (2011) extend their model 
to more than two publishers and show that concerns for minimum product 
differentiation as a result of advertising financing diminish as the number of firms 
increases.  
Recently, Fan (2010) analysed the market for daily newspapers in the US. Her 
structural econometric model allows for endogenous product differentiation. However, 
it focuses on vertical rather than horizontal product differentiation. As such it does not 
address the issue of the political differentiation of newspapers. 
All in all, no paper so far has looked at the impact of collusion on product 
differentiation in two-sided markets, not even in media markets. 
We fill the gap by building on a non-cooperative sequential game developed by 
Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002), which we take as the stage game of an 
infinitely repeated game, modelling a newspaper market where two publishers compete 
for advertising as well as for readership and decide whether and how to collude. 
Publishers first choose the political position of their newspaper, then set cover prices 
and advertising tariffs. Whereas readers single-home, i.e. they buy only one copy of only 
one newspaper, advertisers may multi-home, i.e. they can buy ad spaces from one, both 
or none of the two newspapers.  
We investigate the incentives to collude using grim trigger strategies and report 
the properties of the potential collusive agreements in terms of welfare and pluralism. 
Two kinds of collusion are analysed and compared: in the first, publishers cooperatively 
select both prices and political position; in the second, publishers cooperatively select 
                                                        
9 While Gentzkow (2006) shows that the introduction of TV decreased voter turnout, Gentzkow, Shapiro 
and Sinkinson (2009)  find that entry of newspapers has a robust positive effect on political participation, 
but newspaper competition is not a key driver of turnout as the effect is driven mainly by the first 
newspaper to enter the market, and the effect of a second or third paper is significantly smaller. Della 
Vigna and Kaplan (2007) show instead that the introduction of the Fox News in the US lead to a 
significant increase in votes for Republicans. 
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prices only. Whereas the first leads to intermediate product differentiation, the second 
leads, as in Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002), to minimal product 
differentiation. However, in the latter case, differently from Gabszewicz, Laussel and 
Sonnac (2001, 2002), equilibrium prices are positive.  Whatever the type of collusion, 
our findings confirm the traditional idea that the more competition there is in the 
market, the better off the consumers will be. The effects on total welfare are instead 
ambiguous. 
2. Competition in the newspaper market 
We first introduce the model of competition in the newspaper market developed 
by Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2001, 2002), which we take as the stage game of 
an infinitely repeated game. We also make explicit the condition on the demand 
parameters which guarantees that the market is, as in their work, always covered. Such 
a condition is necessary to compare the competitive outcome with the collusive ones. 
2.1.  The stage game 
The model of Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2002) consists of three steps: 
- first, publishers choose the political orientation of their newspaper out of a unit 
interval representing the political spectrum from extreme left to extreme right;  
- second, given the political position of their newspaper, publishers compete for 
readers; readers are assumed to buy one copy of one newspaper, i.e. they single-
home; 
- third,  publishers compete in the advertising market10; advertisers are assumed 
to buy ad spaces from one, two or neither newspaper, i.e. they multi-home. 
At any step, choices are made simultaneously and are common knowledge at 
every subsequent step. 
Such a game corresponds to a Hotelling spatial duopoly with a further step for 
the advertising competition.11 
2.1.1. Readers demand 
                                                        
10 Note that, in fact, given the particular assumptions on the advertising side, whether firms first set cover 
prices and then advertising tariffs or vice versa is irrelevant. 
11 See Hotelling (1929) as corrected by D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979).  
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Readers have political opinions ranging from extreme left to extreme right; they 
are thus located uniformly on a unit interval [0,1] with every reader ideally 
corresponding to a point on this line. The market size is 1.  
As readers care both about the price of the newspaper and about the political 
orientation, utility of reader r is defined as follows 
 =  − 	
 − 																																																																	1 
where 	  is the distance between the political orientation of newspaper i with  = 1,2, 
and the political opinion of reader	 and 	 denotes the price to be paid for newspaper . 
Readers therefore bear a cost when buying a newspaper, which is proportional to the 
square of the distance between their political opinion and the political line of the 
newspaper. Thus the sum 	
 + 	 is the total cost sustained by reader  when buying 
newspaper . The parameter   represents instead the reservation price of readers when 
buying a copy of a newspaper, i.e. the maximum willingness to pay for a copy of the 
newspaper. In other words, this parameter is interpreted as the intrinsic value of the 
newspaper. Such a value is assumed equal across consumers and newspapers.  
 It is also assumed that readers are indifferent to advertising on daily 
newspapers.12 
Without loss of generality, let us assume that publisher 1 chooses a political 
orientation denoted by  on the unit interval, where  will be the distance between the 
selected point and 0, while publisher 2 chooses a political opinion denoted by  on the 
unit interval, where  will be the distance between the selected point and 1. 
                                                        
12 Empirical evidence on the effect of advertising can be found in Sonnac (2000), who reports that the 
effect of advertising on readers depends on the type of media and on the country, Kaiser and Wright 
(2006), who find a positive but small effect of advertising on the sales of daily newspapers in Germany 
and Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007), who find no effect of advertising on the sales of daily newspapers 
in Italy. A similar finding is reported by Fan (2010) for US daily newspapers and by van Cayselee and 
Vanormelingen (2010) for Belgian daily newspapers. Kaiser and Song (2009) find that readers of 
magazines do not dislike advertising but depending on the type of magazine may also like it. Finally, 
Wilbur (2008) and Jeziorski (2011) respectively find that TV viewers and radio listeners in the US dislike 
advertising. 
The conclusion we draw from the literature above is that on average consumers like advertising in 
magazines (when it is relatively targeted and can be avoided), dislike it on TV (when it is not targeted and 
cannot be avoided) and are indifferent to it on daily newspapers (where it is not targeted but can be 
avoided). As a consequence, we maintain the assumption in Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002) 
that readers are indifferent to advertising on daily newspapers.  
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Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002) assume that every consumer in 
the market buys a copy of a newspaper or, in other words, that the reader market is 
always entirely covered; more formally, the following condition is assumed to be always 
satisfied at equilibrium: 
 − 	
 − 	 ≥ 0																																																																	2 
From now on, we will refer to this inequality as market coverage condition.  
This condition implies the following restrictions on the parameters: 
  ≥ 4				 ≥ 54 +  − 
 																																																											3 
which, as we will see, ensures that the market coverage condition holds for the 
two possible outcomes of the stage game. 
As in a standard Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs, one can 
derive the demand from readers by first identifying the indifferent consumer ! for each 
couple of prices " and 
 and locations  and .  
Figure 1 is a diagrammatic representation of the problem as in Economides 
(1984). The horizontal axis represents the unit interval on which the readers’ opinions 
are listed. Publisher 1 and 2 locate respectively at  and 1 − . Instead, the vertical axis 
displays the reservation price, newspaper cover prices and the total costs faced by 
readers. The intersection between the total cost curves gives the location of the 
consumer ! who is indifferent between buying newspaper 1 or newspaper 2. 
Consumers to the left of ! will sustain a lower total cost when buying newspaper 1 
while consumers to the right of ! will sustain a lower total cost when buying newspaper 
2. In other words, ! splits the market into the demand for newspaper 1, #", and the 
demand for newspaper 2, #
.  
 In Figure 1, ! =  + 

One can thus obtain 
and location  and 13: 
#" = 
$%%
&%
%' + 
 − "21      1  2
 
#
  
$%
%&
%%
'
  "  
21     
1  
2
                                                       
13 Note that, as the reservation price is the same for both newspapers, it does not alter the decision of 
which newspaper to buy. 
Figure 1 
()*(+
,"*-*. "*-*.
  
the demand of newspapers as functions of prices 
0,				/	  
  "21     
1    
2 0  , /		0 1   
  "21     
1  
2
1, /	  
  "21     
1    
2
0, /	  "  
21     
1    
2  ,										if	0 1   "  
21     
1  
2
1,   "  
21     
1    
2
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" and 
 
0
  1 1
4 1
 		      4 
0 0
  1 1
4 1
 		      5 
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Having normalized the mass of readers to 1, #	  can also be seen as the market 
share or the mass of readers of publisher i. 
2.1.2. Advertising demand 
For convenience, the size of the advertising market is assumed to be 4, i.e. there 
are 4 advertisers in the market. Each advertiser’s preferences depend on the price of 
ad spaces in a newspaper and on the mass of readers of that newspaper. The intensity of 
preference for the mass of readers is assumed to depend on a parameter, which 
characterizes each advertiser. Formally, this intensity is represented by the parameter 5, 5 ∈ 70,18 and is referred to an ad space in a newspaper; the advertisers’ population is 
uniformly distributed on 70,18.  
Thus, the utility of buying an ad in newspaper i for an advertiser 	of type 5 is 
measured by: 
- = #	5 − 9	,													 = 1,2; 	5 ∈ 70,18,																													6	 
where #	  represents the amount of readers of newspaper , and 9	 is the advertising 
tariff applied by publisher .  
Each advertiser is willing to buy an ad space in a newspaper as long as her utility 
is higher or equal to 0. Therefore, each advertiser has three possible choices: i) not to 
place an ad in any newspaper; ii) to place an ad in a single newspaper; iii) to place an ad 
in both. Advertisers can therefore multi-home. Each newspaper can carry as many ad 
spaces as demanded. Since each advertiser can place only one ad in each newspaper, the 
quantity of ads in a newspaper will equal the number of advertisers placing ads in that 
newspaper.   
If an advertiser  of type 5 multi-homes, her utility is measured by: 
- = #"5 − 9" + #
5 − 9
																																																										7 
that is each advertiser buys an ad space in a newspaper if her utility to do so is 
positive. It is important to notice that the newspaper market is split into readers of 
newspaper 1 and readers of newspaper 2 because of single-homing on that side. 
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Accordingly, advertisers’ utility from advertising on one newspaper is independent of 
whether or not she advertises also on the other.14   
2.2. The competitive equilibria 
Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2002) solve the model by backward induction 
to find sub-game perfect equilibria. Firstly, they identify the optimal pricing in the 
advertising market; the results are shown in the previous paragraph. Secondly, by 
deriving the profits in (8) with respect to cover prices, they obtain the reaction 
functions for the second step of the game; from them they derive the equilibrium prices 
as functions of the locations. Thirdly, they demonstrate that both a minimal opinion 
differentiation equilibrium and a maximal opinion differentiation equilibrium exist for 
given sets of the parameters. 
2.2.1. Optimal advertising tariffs 
Starting from equation (6) and (7), Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2002) show 
that publishers select 9∗ = #	/2 as equilibrium tariff, leading to revenues equal to #	 . 
Thus, the equilibrium revenues are directly proportional to the mass of readers; in 
other words, for any newspaper sold, the publisher receives a fixed sum from the 
advertisers. Hence,  also identifies the advertising revenues per reader. 
As shown in Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2002), the demand for ad spaces 
in a newspaper is independent from the demand of ad spaces in the other newspaper. 
Hence, publishers enjoy monopoly power on the advertising side for providing access to 
their readers. A similar situation is represented in Armstrong’s (2006) competitive 
bottleneck model. However, here, it is assumed that advertising does not affect readers’ 
utility. As such the model is a particular case of the one in Armstrong (2006). 
2.2.2. Optimal cover prices 
From the previous analysis and supposing that both publishers produce 
newspapers at a unit cost per copy  > 0, we can easily derive the profit functions, 
namely: 
?	 = 	 +  − #	 					 = 1,2																																																								8 
                                                        
14 Note that this assumption on the advertising side, though restrictive and surely debatable, has been 
verified empirically by Rysman (2004) for yellow pages in the US and Fan (2010) for US daily 
newspapers.   
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where ni is defined in either equation (4) or (5). 
The best reply functions are then: 
" = max D0, 12  −  + 
 +  − 2 + 
 − 
E
 = max D0, 12  −  + " +  − 2 + 
 − 
E 
which, depending on the parameters c, t and k and on the political positions 
chosen in the first step, lead to the optimal prices reported in Table 1a. Substituting 
these into the profit equation allows to write profits as a function of political locations, 
as shown in Table 1b. 
 
Parameter regions 
Optimal prices 
(as a function of political locations a 
and b and parameters c, k and t) 
Region 1 
 −  + 1 −  − 1 +  − 3  ≥ 0 −  + 1 −  − 1 +  − 3  ≥ 0
 
 F − G + HI − J − K ≥ L 
 
"∗ =  −  + 1 −  − 1 +  − 3 
∗ =  −  + 1 −  − 1 +  − 3  
 
Region 2 
 −  + 1 −  − M1 +  − 3 N < 0 −  + 1 −  − M1 +  − 3 N < 0
 
  −  + 1 −  −  < 0 
 
"∗ = 0
∗ = 0 
 
Region 3 
 −  + 1 −  − M1 +  − 3 N < 0 −  + 1 −  − M1 +  − 3 N > 0
 
  <  
 
"∗ = 0
∗ = 1/2 −  +  − 2 + 
 − 
 
 
Region 4 
 −  + 1 −  − M1 +  − 3 N ≥ 0 −  + 1 −  − M1 +  − 3 N < 0
 
  ≥  
 
"∗ = 1/2 −  +  − 2 − 
 + 

∗ = 0  
 
 
Table 1a 
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Profits as a function of location 
Region 1 
?"∗,  = 18 1 −  −  −  − 3
 ?
∗,  = 18 1 −  −  −  − 3
 
Region 2 
?"∗,  =  − 1 +  − 2  ?"∗,  =  − 1 +  − 2  
Region 3 
?"∗,  = 14  − −3 + 2 + 4 + 
 − 
 −  +  +  − 1  ?
∗,  = −18  − 2 + 
 − 
 −  + 
−1 +  +   
 
Region 4 
?"∗,  = −18  − 2 + 
 − 
 −  + 
−1 +  +   ?
∗,  = 14  − −3 + 2 + 4 + 
 − 
 −  +  +  − 1  
Table 1b 
 
2.2.3. Equilibrium political positions 
Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2002) demonstrate that both a minimal 
opinion differentiation equilibrium and a maximal opinion differentiation equilibrium 
exist for given sets of the parameters. 
Minimal opinion differentiation equilibrium 
For	 ≥  + 25/72, both publishers choose to locate in the middle of the 
political spectrum (∗ = ∗ = 1/2) and to set a common price equal to  
∗ = 0																																																																				9 
Consequently, they split the market in two equal parts and equilibrium profits 
are: 
?P" =  − 2 																																																													10 
From now on, ?P" identifies profits arising from a one-shot competition in which 
publishers decide to locate in the middle of the political spectrum. Figure 2 displays the 
minimal differentiation equilibrium. 
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Maximal opinion differentiation equilibrium 
For  ≤  + /2, both publishers choose to locate at the endpoints of the political 
spectrum (∗ = ∗ = 0) and to set a common price equal to  
∗ =  −  + 																																																										11  
Consequently, they split the market into two equal parts and equilibrium profits 
are: 
?P
 = 2																																																																12 
From now on, ?P
 identifies profits arising from a one-shot competition in which 
publishers decide to locate at the endpoints of the political spectrum. Figure 3 displays 
the maximal differentiation equilibrium. 
One can check that if  + 
Q,R
 ≤  ≤  + ,
, both equilibria exist. By comparing (12) 
and (10), we can see that for this subset of the parameters ?P
 > ?P": profits made in 
the maximal differentiation equilibrium are higher than profits made in the minimal 
differentiation equilibrium. In other words, the maximal differentiation equilibrium 
Pareto dominates the minimal differentiation equilibrium when both equilibria exist.  
Note that the maximal differentiation equilibrium is the classical outcome of a 
one-sided Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs, as first proposed by 
D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). It can be explained in the same way: firms 
relax competition by locating at the endpoints. On the other hand, the existence of the 
minimal differentiation equilibrium is the main contribution of Gabszewicz, Laussel and 
Sonnac (2002) and the one on which Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001) focus their 
discussion: this equilibrium arises because of the presence of the advertising side, 
which makes stealing customers from the rival more profitable. Indeed, it can be seen 
that the equilibrium is sustainable if the advertising market is large enough: in this case 
gaining a reader is more profitable because advertising revenues per reader are higher. 
Furthermore, if the advertising market is very large, only the minimal differentiation 
equilibrium remains: due to advertising, competition for readers is very harsh and the 
publishers do not choose to locate at the endpoints anymore.  
Thus, Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2002) conclude that convergence in the 
political orientation of newspapers could result from a rise in the importance of 
 advertisements as source of revenues. In other words, as argued by Gabszewicz
and Sonnac (2001), the growth of advertising as a source of revenues for newspapers 
can help explain the emergence of the so
 
 
Condition (3) guarantees that the reservation price is high enough for the market 
to be entirely covered in both equilibria
model. It is important to make this condition explicit as we move to 
repeated game and the possibility of collusive 
reservation price, publishers could collude at an indefinitely high price at no cost.
-called Pensée Unique. 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 
 of the Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac
behaviour. Indeed, without a finite 
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3. Collusion in the newspaper market 
We employ the sequential game described above as a stage game of an infinitely 
repeated game. In this multi-period framework, publishers may choose to cooperate in 
order to obtain higher profits.  
We assume that publishers take into account as collusive agreements only Pareto 
optimal agreements, i.e. pairs of strategies that cannot be changed without decreasing at 
least one of the two publishers’ payoffs. 
We then assume that the agreement is implemented over time by using grim 
trigger strategies, i.e. each publisher cooperates as long as the other publisher 
cooperates and punishes forever any defection from the agreement and believes the 
other publisher will behave in the same way.  
As already discussed, in our model publishers enjoy monopoly power on 
advertisers for access to their readers. Accordingly, acting cooperatively cannot 
improve this already optimal behaviour. As a result, any optimal strategy of the 
repeated game cannot include a different advertising tariff than the competitive one. In 
practice, publishers can only collude on the cover price and on the political orientation. 
As we will see, this does not imply that advertising is not relevant anymore, but that 
publishers will not need to collude on that side of the market. 
We thus take into consideration two kinds of agreements: in the first one, 
publishers coordinate both the political orientation and the prices of the newspapers; in 
the second one, publishers coordinate prices only. Whereas the first is a case of full 
collusion15, the second one is a case of semi-collusion and fits well with an environment 
in which publishers find it difficult to coordinate on the political orientation of their 
newspapers.  
When publishers are colluding on both political orientation and prices, we 
assume that if a publisher defects when choosing political position for its newspaper, 
punishment starts already at the next price stage (and goes on forever). 
                                                        
15 To be precise, to the extent that collusion does not take place on the advertising tariff both are cases of 
semi-collusion. However, as noted above, in this model collusion on the advertising tariff does not make 
sense as publishers already enjoy monopoly power over access to the readers of their newspapers and, in 
addition, readers are assumed to be indifferent to advertising.  
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The main aims of the analysis are: firstly, investigating the factors facilitating 
collusion; secondly, inspecting the properties of the collusive agreements in terms of 
welfare and pluralism in the media. 
Given the assumptions above, following Friedman and Thisse (1993), we first 
look for possible collusive agreements among the Pareto optimal outcomes of the stage 
game. When more than one Pareto optimum is identified, publishers select the Pareto 
optimum that implies setting common prices; if none of the Pareto optima imply 
common prices, publishers select the one which implies splitting the market in the 
middle (this will not happen anyway). Indeed, setting a common price is a plausible 
outcome since the firms are symmetric. Furthermore, coordination on a common price 
is easier to achieve and a defection from a common price is easier to detect, thus 
facilitating collusion. 
Publishers adhere to a collusive agreement supported by grim trigger strategies 
as long as the discounted sum of profits associated with collusion is higher than the 
discounted sum of profits associated with defection.  
Let us assume that ?S  are the collusion profits, ?P are the Nash profits, and ?T 
are the defection profits, following Motta (2004), this problem can be formalized as 
follows: U1 − U ?S − ?P ≥ ?T − ?S																															VW#													13 
The left hand side of the inequality represents the sum of discounted future 
losses due to defection, while the right hand side represents the one-time gain from 
optimal defection. The critical discount factor is easily derived as: 
UX = ?T − ?S?T − ?P																																																																	14 
For all discount factors above UX, publishers will find it more profitable to collude than to 
defect. This critical discount factor will depend on the parameters of the game; as a 
consequence, any change in one of the parameters implies altering the profitability and 
sustainability of collusion. For example, if a change in parameters makes the critical 
discount factor increase, the set of discount factors supporting collusion is smaller and 
therefore collusion will be harder to sustain. 
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3.1. Collusion on prices and political orientation 
In this paragraph collusion on prices and political orientation is analysed; firstly, 
the collusive agreement is investigated; secondly, the optimal defection strategy is 
found. Collusion profits and defection profits are then obtained. 
3.1.1. Collusive agreement 
As stated above, we first characterize the Pareto optima of the game. Then we 
select as possible collusive agreement the Pareto optimum with common price.  
We will call state a particular pair of strategies , ", , 
. 16 A state can be 
improved if a different state implies increasing the payoff of one publisher without 
decreasing the payoff of the other. When a state can be improved, such state cannot be a 
Pareto optimum.  
Lemma 1. Any state for which all readers obtain a utility strictly higher than 0 can 
be improved. 
Proof: Take a state , ", , 
 and let ! denote the marginal consumer who 
splits the market in the demand for 1, !, and the demand for 2, 1 − !, in such state. Take 
now the lowest utility consumer as the reader with the lowest utility associated with 
such state: this consumer can only be in 0, 1 or ! because they are the most distant from 
the location of the newspaper she buys. She is paying a total price lower than her 
reservation price. The publishers can mutually increase their payoff by simply 
increasing their prices by the same amount ∆" = ∆
 so that the lowest utility 
consumer still buys a copy: thus, all the readers are buying a copy in this new state , " + ∆", , 
 + ∆
, while ! is constant because the change in prices is the same 
for both newspapers. To conclude, the demands are unchanged but prices are higher 
and, as a consequence, payoffs increase. QED. 
Figure 4 summarizes what happens in Lemma 1. 
                                                        
16 Advertising tariffs are kept out of the definition of state for the sake of simplicity, as the optimal tariff 
does not change during the analysis. 
 Lemma 1 is useful not only because it helps to characterize the Pareto optima of 
the game, but also because it suggests how 
just need to increase prices so that the lowest utility consumer is taken from positive 
utility to utility 0. 
Definition 1. A state for which at least one consumer obtains utility 0 is called touch 
state. This consumer is called reservation price consumer and can be in 0, 1 or 
Therefore at least one of the following conditions is to be satisf
state: 
if	reservation	price	consumer	is	at	
if	reservation	price	consumer	is	at	
if	reservation	price	consumer	is	at	
Pareto optima are to be found among the touch states. 
some touch states. 
Lemma 2. Any touch state for which only
improved. 
Proof: The proof consists in finding a state
better off by taking consumers in 0, 
To begin with, let us consider how each publisher tends to relocate when she 
takes into account that her demand is kept fixed by
when publisher 1’s demand 
Figure 4 
publishers can easily improve a state: they 
0:																																																															
y:	u  ty  a
  p"  u  t1  y1:																																																															u
Lemma
 one consumer obtains utility 0
, which makes both the publishers 
! and 1 to utility 0.  
 the other publisher. For example, 
! is fixed, we can derive her profits from (8):
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?" = " +  − !. 
It is easy to see how the publisher will set the highest price compatible with the 
coverage of her demand; this optimum price will be: 
"∗ 	= g − ! − 
, 			if	0 ≤  < !/2 − 
, 			if	!/2 ≤  ≤ !																																								 
Her profits can be written as: 
?" = g − ! − 
 +  − !, if	0 ≤  < !/2 − 
 +  − !, if	!/2 ≤  ≤ !																														 
Taking the first derivative with respect to , we find that 
h?"h > 0, if	0 ≤  < !/2h?"h < 0, if	!/2 ≤  ≤ !
 																																											15 
The optimal location is therefore ∗ = !/2. The same result can be similarly 
derived for publisher 2, her optimal location is ∗ = 1 − !/2. 
Expression (15) also states that each publisher tends to relocate to the middle of 
her demand when the other publisher simply accommodates this relocation in order to 
maintain the indifference at !. In fact both publishers can relocate following this 
tendency: the final state will imply that the demand is still at ! while prices are higher 
and therefore payoffs are bigger. In this final state, consumers in 0, ! and 1 are kept at 
utility 0. To conclude, a state in which consumers in 0, ! and 1 are kept at utility 0 
improves a state in which only one of these consumers is kept at utility 0 and the 
marginal consumer is at !.17 QED. 
Like Lemma 1, Lemma 2 helps to restrict the set of eligible Pareto optima. 
Lemma 2 also suggests how the publishers can relocate to improve a touch state. This 
can be understood as follows. If in a touch state both newspapers are located in the 
middle of their readerships, it is actually a complete touch state. Instead, if in a touch 
state a newspaper is not located in the middle of its demand, a relocation of this 
newspaper permits to both publishers to increase their price. Indeed, it can be noticed 
                                                        
17 In the proof, the respective demands are kept constant to the touch state levels. This is only a fiction 
that helps to characterize Pareto optima: once they are fully characterized, different Pareto optima will 
imply different market shares and the publishers will be able to choose among them. 
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that a reservation price consumer is located at one of the endpoints of the demand of 
that newspaper (see Figure 5 for a visual representation). If the publisher of this 
newspaper shifts her location slightly towards the reservation price consumer, she can 
increase her price so that the reservation price consumer obtains again utility zero after 
the relocation. At the same time, the other publisher can increase her price so that the 
marginal consumer is kept at the same location: the demands are the same and the 
prices have increased. The procedure can be repeated until the newspaper converges 
towards the middle of its readership: in that case both the consumers on the endpoints 
are reservation price consumers. Since the utility of readers depends on prices and 
transportation costs (the reservation price is constant), decreasing the transportation 
costs of the readers permits to increase the price. In fact, each publisher relocates in the 
middle of her demand in order to reduce the transportation costs sustained by her 
readers; this permits to impose higher prices without losing consumers. 
Thanks to Lemma 2 we can introduce the following definition. 
Definition 2. A state for which consumers in 0, 1 and ! are reservation price 
consumers is called complete touch state. 
 Therefore the following conditions are to be satisfied by the complete touch 
state: 
u − ta
 − p" = 0,u − ty − a
 − p" = u − t1 − y − b
 − p
 = 0,u − tb
 − p
 = 0.  
The strategies supporting this kind of state are the following 
publisher	1	applies:	(!2		 ,  −  !4
)
publisher	2	applies:	(1 − !2 		 ,  −  (1 − !)4 
)																																	(16) 
Publishers locate in the middle of their demand and set prices that keep 
consumers at the extremes of their demands at utility 0. Every complete touch state is 
characterized only by the marginal consumer !, 0 ≤ ! ≤ 1.  
Lemma 2 and Definition 2 can be better understood in the light of the graphical 
representation in Figure 5. The dashed curves correspond to the new complete touch 
state.  
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To find the Pareto optima of the game, one last question has to be answered: can 
a complete touch state be improved? Lemma 3 identifies the Pareto optima of the game 
by answering this question. 
Lemma 3. Every complete touch state is a Pareto optimum. 
Proof. The proof consists in checking that starting from any point on the unit 
interval, any change in ! does not increase the payoff of one publisher without 
decreasing the payoff of the other publisher.  
First, profits can be written as:  
?" = M −  !4
 +  − N !?
 = k −  1 − !4 
 +  − l 1 − ! 
Differentiating the profit functions with respect to ! we find that, given the 
parameters compatible with the assumptions of this model: h?"h! > 0		∀! ∈ 70,18h?
h! < 0		∀! ∈ 70,18 
Therefore in all cases the profit of one publisher cannot be increased without the 
profit of the other to decrease. QED. 
Once Pareto optima are identified, publishers select the state, which implies a 
common price: in practice, the following expression has to be satisfied: 
 −  !
4 =  −  1 − !
4  
which in turn implies: 
! = 12. 
Thus, the complete touch state with ! = 1 2⁄ 		forms the agreement between the 
publishers when they cooperate on both prices and locations. Besides, this agreement 
implies common prices and profits and splitting the market in the middle. These 
features suggest that it is actually plausible for the publishers to find an agreement on 
such a pair of strategies. 
 Taking (16) with ! =
at ¾ of the unit interval and to set a common price equal to 
This leads to 
Proposition 1.  When collusion ta
price of the newspaper, the collusi
Publishers choose  =  = ¼
The corresponding collusive profits for 
From now on, we will refer to expression (17) as collusion profits 
publishers are allowed to collude on prices and locations. 
graphically represented in Figure 6.
 
1 2⁄ , we can verify that publishers agree to locate at ¼ and 
  t/16.   
kes place on both the political orientation and the cover 
ve agreement implies medium political differentiation
	and set a common price 	    ,"p.   
each publisher will be: 
?Sqr  ?"  ?
  s 
16    t2 							
The collusion outcome i
  
Figure 5 
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 During the analysis, we have assumed the market to be covered.  I
to check that.  
Corollary 1.  If the market is covered in competition, it will be covered also under collusion
on both prices and political location.
Let us consider the profits made by a publisher located in ¼ who increases its 
price above  − /16. The readership associated with th
identified through the normal functions in (4). Nevertheless, it is easy to note that the 
readership shrinks and is distributed for one half 
other half to the right. The marginal consumer on th
zero18; recalling (1), we find the location of this reader is
Thus, it is easy to observe that the readership is now
Recalling the profit function in (8), we can observe that the new profit func
                                                       
18 In this case, between buying a copy and not buying.
Figure 6 
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? = 2w −   +  − 																																																				18 
We can check that the profits in (18) are never higher than the collusive profits 
in (17) when the parameters set is restricted as in (3) and  >  − /16. 19 The 
argument is parallel for the publisher located at ¾. Accordingly, if the market is covered 
in competition, it will be covered also under collusion. QED 
3.1.2. Defection 
Since punishment starts after any defection at any step of the game, each 
publisher has two alternatives to defect: first, she could select a political orientation 
different from the agreed one at the first step of a stage game and then compete in 
prices in the second step; second, she could stick with the agreed political orientation 
and defect on the cover price at the second step. Clearly she will select the defection that 
offers the higher payoff. 
In order to find the optimal defection strategy it is necessary to find the optimal 
defection strategies of the two cases separately and then compare the payoffs. We 
should keep in mind that the non-deviant publisher applies the strategy 
M14 ,  − 16N																																																																							19 
Proposition 2. The optimal defection strategy consists of keeping political position 
unchanged and setting a price equal to: 
∗ =
$%&
%'x =  +  −  + 716 2 , if		y ≤  −  + 2516 ̅ =  − 916 , if		 >  −  + 2516 
 																													20	 
Defection profits are then 
?x =  +  −  + 716 
4 																																																									21 
?̅ =  − 916  +  − 																																																									22	 
                                                        
19 It should be remembered that the restrictions in (3) ensures the competitive equilibria exist once the 
market coverage condition is assumed. 
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Proof. See Appendix A. 
3.2. Collusion on prices only 
3.2.1. Collusive agreement 
When publishers are allowed to collude on prices only, at the first step of the 
stage game, they locate independently while at the second step they set prices 
cooperatively. Therefore, publishers locate on the political opinion spectrum taking into 
account that they will apply an agreed rule on prices.  
Like the collusive agreement on prices and political orientations, the collusive 
agreement on prices only has to be a state for which it is not possible to increase the 
payoff of one publisher without decreasing the payoff of the other publisher, i.e. a 
Pareto optimum. However, here publishers cannot choose a state within the entire set 
available, because that would mean they cooperatively select locations as well. Instead 
they choose a rule on prices that will take the pair of locations as given. Hence, the rule 
identifies a state for every possible pair of locations.  
Thus we first identify the cooperative rule on prices for the second stage and 
then find the equilibrium behaviour for the first stage taking into account this rule. 
The cooperative rule for prices is to be optimal and one could start by 
characterizing the Pareto optima. It is important to remember, however, that publishers 
are assumed to set a common price when more than one Pareto optimum is identified. 
Therefore, we can proceed in a different way: we first take the best common-price-rule 
into account and then check if it selects Pareto optima.  
The best common-price-rule can be identified starting from Lemma 1: indeed, 
Lemma 1 shows how every state for which all the readers obtain a utility higher than 0 
can be improved. This is valid also for the current case in which locations are held 
constant.20 Consequently, given the pair of locations , , publishers have to choose 
among all the touch states compatible with such pair of locations. This result is summed 
up in Lemma 4. 
Lemma 4. Given a pair of locations ,  publishers choose a state among the 
touch states. 
                                                        
20 In the proof of Lemma 1, locations are held constant. 
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Lemma 4 however does not fully characterize Pareto optima for the case of 
cooperative selection of prices only. Yet, it selects the only candidate states for Pareto 
optima: applying the same-price-rule to touch states we therefore obtain the best 
possible same-price-rule. 
The common price has to be set according to the consumer who pays the 
maximal transportation cost in the market; indeed, this consumer will be the one facing 
utility 0 in the outcome. As stated above, her location can be 0, 1 +  − /2 or 1. The 
most distant one among them from the opinion  or  of the newspaper bought by that 
consumer, characterizes the price.21 
Definition 3. Any touch state , x, , x with common pricing is characterized as 
follows: 
x =  −  "*-*.){ 						if			|"*-*.
 > 	"*-*.
 >   																																															(22)  
x =  − 
						if			 }1 −  − 2 ≤ 	 ≥   																																																		(23) 
x =  − 
						if			 }1 −  − 2 ≤ 	 >  																																																			(24) 
Figure 7 summarizes case 3) of the pricing rule. 
                                                        
21 Once the pair (, ) is constant, publishers can set a common price, select a touch state, and cover the 
entire market at the same time, only by setting the price according to the largest values among , ,	and	(1 −  − )/2, which are the distance from the newspaper bought by respectively consumer 0, 1,	and	1 +  − /2 = !. 
 In brief, once , 	is given from the first step, publishers cooperatively select 
the touch state with common price compatible with such couple 
that such a state is unique and therefore the pricing rule is well defined. What remains 
to be demonstrated is that this pricing rule, i.e. the best common
selects Pareto optima. In other words, it should not be possible to find a state for which 
a publisher increases her profits without the profits of the other to decrease starting 
from the touch state selected and changing prices only. This result is derived in 
Proposition 3. 
Lemma 5. The best common
Proof. See Appendix A.
We now have all the instruments to find the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3. When collusion takes place on the cover price of the newspaper only, 
the collusive agreement implies mi
    1 2	 and set a common price  
The corresponding collusive profits for each publishe
?Sr
Proof. See Appendix A. 
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; it is easy to note 
-rule, always 
																										25 
 The result is rather straightforward: once a rule on pricing has been agreed, 
publishers behave like the two firms of a differentiated 
famous ice-cream sellers on a beach). The only difference is that this common price 
changes with the resulting pair of locations but the incentive to gain market share is 
very similar: the only possible Nash equilibrium consi
From now on, we will refer to the
when publishers are allowed to collude on prices only. 
The equilibrium is represented in Figure 
market is split in the middle, i.e. newspaper 1 caters to readers
newspaper 2 caters to readers 
During the analysis, we
case of collusion on both prices and political orientation. 
It is not difficult to check  
Corollary 2 - If the market is covered in competition, it will be covered also under 
collusion on prices. 
The proof is similar to the one given in Paragr
Let us consider the joint profits made by publishers located 
common price above  − /4
cannot be identified through the functions in (4) and (5). Nevertheless, it is 
duopoly with common price (the 
sts in the pair of locations (½, ½).
 expression in (25) as collusion profits 
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that publisher 1 sells to readers located to the left of ½ and publisher 2 sells to readers 
located to the right of ½. Naturally, the readerships are equal. The marginal consumer 
on the right endpoint obtains utility zero22; recalling (1), we find the location of this 
reader is 
uv = 12 + w −   
Thus, it is easy to observe that the readership of each newspaper is now 
# = w −   
Recalling the profit function in (8), we can observe that the new profit function is 
? = w −   +  − 																																							26 
We can check that the profits in (26) are never higher than the collusive profits 
in (25) when the parameters set is restricted as in (3) and  >  − /4. 23 
Accordingly, if the market is covered in competition, it will be covered also under 
collusion. QED 
3.2.2. Defection 
At the first stage, the non-deviant publisher chooses location ½: whatever the 
location of the defecting publisher, the common price will be set at  − ,{ since the most 
distant consumers will be ½ distant from the non defecting publisher. Therefore, the 
non-deviant publisher plays the equilibrium strategy in any case. 
In order to find the optimal defection strategy we can use the procedure 
employed in the previous paragraph. The same reasoning on punishment and 
expectations is assumed to hold for this case as well. We should keep in mind that the 
non-deviant publisher applies the strategy: 
                                                        
22 In this case, between buying a copy and not buying. 
23 It should be remembered that the restrictions in (3) allow the competitive equilibria to exist once the 
market coverage condition is assumed. 
 Proposition 4. When the publishers collude on prices only, a publisher optimally 
defects by locating at the same point of the collusive strategy and applying a slightly lower 
price. 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The optimal defection consists in undercutting. The location is held at ½ so that 
both the newspapers remain located 
expensive newspaper. 
Profits related to this strategy are:
The optimal defection strategy is displayed in Figure 
 
3.3. Welfare analysis 
In normal one-sided markets, collusion usually implies 
welfare and in total welfare. Only firms gain.
In a two-sided market, we have 
advertisers in our case) and the firms. 
consumers on one side of the market gain even if they pay a hi
M12 ,   4N																																													
 
at the same point: readers simply buy the less 
 
?Tr    4    																							
9: 
Figure 9 
a loss in both consumer 
 
two distinct groups of consumers 
As discussed at the beginning, it is possible that
gher price. This is the 
32 
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case when the benefit those consumers enjoy from interacting with a higher number of 
people on the other side of the market is higher than the loss due to the price increase. 
Given the assumption that readers are indifferent to advertising, which we have 
extensively justified above, the particular outcome just described could take place only 
on the advertiser side of the market. 
Yet, in our model, as in Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002), 
advertisers always pay the monopoly price, even in competition. Thus, only the total 
mass of readers affects the utility of advertisers; however, since the market is always 
covered, the mass of readers is always 1 and the advertisers’ surplus does not change 
throughout the analysis.24   
As a consequence, we will focus on the component of total welfare which is equal 
to the sum of the readers’ surplus plus the publishers’ profits. For the sake of simplicity 
we will redefine this to be total welfare. 
3.3.1. Readers’ and publishers’ surplus 
The effects of collusive behaviour on readers and publishers are measured 
hereafter. 
The readers’ surplus can be defined as follows: 
 =  7 −  − 
 − "8 +  7 − 1 −  − 
 − 
" 8																		29 
Joint profits are: ( = ?" + ?
 = " +  − ! + 
 +  − 1 − !																	30 
Total welfare can therefore be identified as:  +( = ,																																																														31 
It is easy to derive readers’, publishers’ and total welfare for the several cases 
analysed in this work: 
 
Competition - Minimal political differentiation equilibrium 
Readers’    − 12 
                                                        
24 An analytical reason for this can be found by observing the utility of any advertiser in (6). 
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Publishers’ (  −  
Total ,  − 12 +  −  
Table 2 
Competition - Maximal political differentiation equilibrium 
Readers’    − 23 +  −  
Publishers’ (  
Total ,  + 3 +  −  
Table 3 
Collusion on prices and locations (medium political differentiation equilibrium) 
Readers’   24 
Publishers’ (  − 16 +  −  
Total ,  − 48 +  −  
Table 4 
Collusion on prices only (minimal political differentiation equilibrium) 
Readers’   6 
Publishers’ (  − 4 +  −  
Total ,  − 12 +  −  
Table 5 
3.3.2. Welfare implications 
Using the tables above, several comparisons can be made. They will be analysed 
firstly from a consumer welfare perspective and secondly from a total welfare 
perspective.  
However, before starting to compare the results above, it is worth noticing that 
in this framework prices are never so high that they prevent any consumer from buying 
a newspaper, or to put it simply, the market is always covered. Consequently, no 
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possible increase in prices can reduce the total demand of newspapers, meaning that 
any shift in prices only implies a redistribution of surplus between readers and 
publishers. Nevertheless, shifts in prices are often associated with shifts in the political 
orientations of newspapers, with positive or negative effects on each reader’s utility and 
in turn on readers’ surplus. 
From a reader’s perspective, the competitive outcomes outperform both 
collusive outcomes; moreover, collusion on prices only is better than collusion on both 
prices and locations. For the subset of the parameters for which both competitive 
equilibria are sustained, the equilibrium with minimal differentiation is better than the 
equilibrium with maximal differentiation. Thus no gain in the readers’ welfare due to 
relocation of newspapers in the political spectrum is large enough to offset the price 
increase. These results confirm the idea that the more competition there is in the 
market, the better off readers are.  
Therefore, in our model, the two-sided nature of the market, albeit there, is such 
that it makes no exception to the general rule that competition is good for consumers.  
From a total welfare perspective, results are not as clear as from a readers’ 
perspective. It is easy to check that collusion on prices and political orientations 
outperforms collusion on prices only. 
Compared to the minimal differentiation equilibrium, collusion outcomes show 
interesting results: the collusion-on-prices-only outcome provides the same welfare 
while the collusion-on-everything outcome does even better. This means that the gains 
provided to the publishers by collusive agreements either exceed or just offset the 
losses in the readers’ surplus. Indeed: 
,S			(	v	 =  − 12 +  −  = ,						.	u 
,S			,	 =  − 48 +  −  >  − 12 +  −  = ,						.	u 
These results represent an exception to the acknowledged fact that collusion 
brings about allocative efficiency losses. This particular effect is due to high competition 
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in the minimal differentiation equilibrium and to the fact that once the market is 
covered in competition, it will be covered in collusion as well. 
On the contrary, considering the maximal differentiation equilibrium, 
comparisons with the collusive agreements show that the former can outperform as 
well as underperform the latter, depending on the parameters of the game. In detail, 
total welfare associated with the collusion-on-everything outcome exceeds total welfare 
associated with maximal differentiation equilibrium if 
 + 1796  <  ≤ c + 2 
Similarly, total welfare associated with the collusion-on-prices-only outcome 
exceeds total welfare associated with the maximal differentiation equilibrium if 
 + 524  <  ≤  + 2 
It is worth observing that each of these two new parameters sets splits the 
parameters set  ≤ c + /2 for which the maximal differentiation equilibrium is 
sustained. The situation is summarized in Figure 10: the black line represents  = c + /2, the red line represents  =  + "Rp , and the blue line represents  =  + Q
{ , with  = 1. Thus, the red and blue lines delimit the sets of parameters for 
which total welfare is higher under collusion or under competition.  
In conclusion, when the competitive outcome is the minimal differentiation 
equilibrium, i.e. when the advertising market is very large and the per-reader 
advertising revenues are high: 
- a collusive agreement on prices and locations provides a perfect trade-off 
between consumers’ welfare and total welfare, i.e. consumers’ welfare decreases while 
total welfare increases; 
- a collusive agreement on prices only brings about no consequences for total 
welfare but harms consumers.  
In the latter case, prices go up while locations remain constant, so only a 
redistribution of surplus takes place. Instead in the former case, prices go up but 
locations improve from the point of view of readers. Indeed, it is easy to note that the 
 new location pair minimizes the sum of the transportation costs sustained by all 
readers. Furthermore, the pair of collusive strategies permits the publishers to make the 
most from the market and to maximize their joint profits.
Figure 10 Welfare Implications of Collusion with Maximal Differentiation Equilibrium
Similarly, when the competitive outcome is the maximal differentiation 
equilibrium, i.e. when the advertising market is small and per
revenues are low: 
- both forms of collusion harm consumers; 
- but total welfare can increase or decrease, depending on the parameters; in 
particular, whatever the form of collusion, total welfare 
the ratio of the advertising market parameter
readers t.  
3.4.  Incentives to collude
We now recover the critical discount factor for each type of collusion and each 
the stage game equilibria, which would be used as a punishment in case of defection.
It is then possible to analyse the change in the incentives to collude by 
differentiating each discount factor with respect to each parameter. Any change in a 
parameter which decreases 
supporting collusion and therefore makes collusion more likely. 
 
 
-reader advertising 
 
is likely to decrease 
 k to the political sensitiveness of the 
 
a critical discount factor, enlarges the set of discount factors 
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3.4.1. Collusion on prices only 
The critical discount factors when publishers collude on prices only are  
Punishment triggered Critical discount factor 
Minimal differentiation equilibrium  ≥  + 25/72 UXr 
Maximal differentiation equilibrium  ≤ c + t/2 UXr 
Table 6 
 
where, recalling that UX = ** and substituting the relevant expressions for 
profits as a function of the parameters, 
 
UX r =
4 − 4 +  − 4
4 − 4 + 2 − 8 
UX r =
4 − 4 +  − 4
8 − 8 + 6 − 8  
Below, we report the effect of an increase in the exogenous parameters on the 
critical discount factor. Clearly, a higher discount factor makes collusion less likely while 
a lower one makes collusion more likely. 
 
Parameter 
Punishment triggered 
Minimal differentiation Maximal differentiation 
Political sensitiveness (t) positive Positive 
39 
 
Advertising market dimension (k) positive Negative 
Marginal cost (c) negative Positive 
Reservation price ()  negative Negative 
Table 7 
 
The results shown in Table 7 can be summarized and explained as follows. 
Political sensitiveness. As readers become more sensitive to political messages, 
i.e. the transportation cost increases, collusion among publishers is less likely. The 
reason for this is not straightforward: defection as well as collusion profits decrease, but 
the former effect outweighs the latter so that the one-time gain from defection 
decreases. However, punishment profits are either increasing or constant in the political 
sensitiveness: future losses due to current defection are thus enlarged. This effect 
cancels out the previous one.  
The intuition is that the more readers are politically conscious, the easier it is for 
newspapers to find their own readership: in fact readers will be more attached to their 
“closer” newspaper. Indeed the equilibrium of maximal differentiation is sustained by 
high transportation parameters, everything else being equal: readers are easier to be 
targeted and competition can be relaxed by locating at the endpoints of the unit interval. 
Therefore, the newspapers do not need to coordinate decisions to cater to different 
segments of the market. 
Reservation price. Collusion is in general easier to sustain if the reservation 
price increases. Two countervailing effects take place: on one hand, defection profits 
increase more than the collusion profits, exactly like in the case of the transportation 
cost; on the other hand the punishment profits are steady in respect to the reservation 
price while the collusion profits increase. The second effect offsets the first one. In fact, 
this confirms the idea that when two firms collude they can exploit the market more 
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than they could do competing. An increase in the reservation price shifts the demand 
outward and allows publishers to gain more from collusion.25 
Advertising market dimension. Interestingly the effect of a larger advertising 
market (and thus higher revenues per reader) on collusion strongly depends on the 
punishment triggered and, in turn, on the parameters. This means that a shift in the 
parameter can foster as well as discourage collusive behaviour depending on the 
starting value of the parameter itself. 
In order to obtain a complete picture of how the incentives to collude depend on 
the advertising parameter k, a graphical representation of the results of Table 7 is 
provided below in Figure 11. The graph displays the critical discount factor (on the 
vertical axis) as a function of the dimension of the advertising market (on the horizontal 
axis).26 Note that, given the reservation price, the marginal cost of the newspaper, and 
the political sensitiveness, the advertising market dimension  can take values above  
only, as also the conditions in (3) need to be satisfied.27 For low values of ,  ≤  < ", 
only the equilibrium of maximal differentiation is sustainable in one-shot competition. 
For intermediate values of , " ≤  < 
, both equilibria are sustainable. For high 
values of ,  ≥ 
, only the equilibrium of minimal differentiation is sustainable.28 The 
green curve shows the critical discount factor when the punishment triggered is the 
maximal differentiation equilibrium (UX
r,); instead, the red curve shows the critical 
discount factor when the punishment triggered is the minimal differentiation 
equilibrium (UX"r). 
                                                        
25 Note that here the effect is reinforced by the assumption that the market is always covered: publishers 
can cooperatively set prices as functions of the reservation price itself (see the prices under collusion at 
(17) and (25)) while, when they are competing, they simply guarantee that the prices are not too high so 
that everyone is buying a newspaper. 
26 The chosen values for the other parameters are:  = 2,  = 2,  = 1, which satisfy the assumptions of 
the model. 
27 These conditions allow the market to be covered in the competitive outcomes of the stage game. 
28  = Q{ , " =
"p
R
 , 
 =
Q

. 
  
As we can observe, the critical discount factor decreases as long as the starting 
value is low, i.e. when the punishment triggered can only be the maximal differentiation 
equilibrium; it increases from intermediate values on, i.e. when the punishment 
triggered can only be the minimal differentiation equilibrium; not surprisingly, for 
intermediate values, i.e. when both equilibria are sustainable, the effects depend on the 
punishment chosen. To sum up,
punishment is triggered and 
When k is high enough, so that
equilibrium, any further increase in the advertising market increases the critical 
discount factor and makes col
defection and punishment profits are all increasing functions of 
profits increase more than collusion profits so that the one
collusion profits and punishment profits increase in the same way so that future losses 
will be steady. Thus, collusion is less feasible when 
be offered by noting that the advertising parameter represents the sum paid to each 
publisher for any copy sold: the market is split in the middle when publishers collude as 
well as when they compete but not when one of them defects; thus, if 
becomes more profitable than colluding and than competing because the deviant has 
more readers than in the other cases. Thus, the trend exhibited for high levels of 
Figure 11 
 the relative magnitude of  will determine which 
which is therefore the effect of a higher k.
 the punishment is the minimal differentiation 
lusion less likely. First, it should be noticed that collusion, 
; in fact, defection 
-time gain increases; 
 grows. An explanation of this can 
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k rises, defecting 
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seems to be explained by the fact that each publisher gains more and more for any 
additional reader she can cater to by defecting; this makes defection more likely. 
Once could argue that the same reasoning applies when the punishment 
triggered is a maximal differentiation equilibrium; indeed, defection and collusion 
profits are identical to the previous case; hence, gaining market share in the defection 
turn is more profitable when the advertising market dimension is higher. Nevertheless, 
as shown in the graph, when the one-stage equilibrium is the maximal differentiation 
one, punishment profits do not depend on the dimension of the advertising market. This 
may sound surprising. However, recall from  (11) that competitive prices are in that 
case: 
∗ =  +  −  
So that the revenue per reader k is entirely passed on to readers in form of a 
discount on the cover price: the publishers internalize the indirect network effects 
running from the advertisers to the readers; they bridge the two sides perfectly and 
make no money on it. Indeed, the respective profits as in (12) are: 
?P
 =

2 
Conversely, collusion prices do not depend on the advertising market dimension, 
while the profits do (see (17) and (25)). Thus, when the publishers collude, they do not 
subsidise the readers with the advertising receipts they earn. When passing from 
competition to collusion, the publishers pass from a situation in which the advertising 
receipts are totally passed on to readers to a situation in which the advertising receipts 
are totally retained. Therefore, if the advertising revenues per reader increase, collusion 
becomes more and more desirable and therefore more likely. 
Marginal cost of a copy. The analysis of the change in the collusive incentives 
due to a change in the marginal cost is in fact symmetric to the previous one. The reason 
is that, although marginal cost and the dimension of the advertising market are 
conceptually different, due to the assumptions about the advertising market, they enter 
the profit function in (8) in additive way. The only difference is the sign: advertising 
represents a source of revenues while the unit cost is a burden to sustain. In addition 
both parameters are per copy. 
 First and foremost it is true that, as with advertising, the effect of the 
cost on collusion strongly depends on the punishment triggered and, in turn, on the 
parameters of the game. 
The graph in Figure 1
a function of the per copy cost
reservation parameter, the advertising market dimension, and the transportation cost, 
the unit cost  can have values only 
satisfied. The admissible values are therefore 
, only the equilibrium of minimal differentiation is sustainable in one
competition. For intermediate va
For relatively high values of
differentiation is sustainable.
the punishment triggered is the maximal differentiation equilibrium (
red curve shows the critical discount factor when the punishment triggered is the 
minimal differentiation equili
The critical discount factor decreases as long as the starting value is low, i.e. 
when the punishment triggered can only be the minimal differentiation equilibrium; it 
increases from intermediate values 
                                                       
29 As before, the values of the other parameters are: 
assumptions of the model. 
30 Note that  = 
 , "  "
R
 , 
 
2 shows the critical discount factor (on the vertical axis) 
 of the newspapers (on the horizontal axis)
below 
 as the conditions in (3) 0 0  0 
. For low values of 
lues of ,  0  0 ", both equilibria are sustainable. 
 , " 1  1 
, only the equilibrium of maximal 
30 The green curve shows the critical discount factor when 
brium (UX"r,). 
Figure 12 
on, i.e. when the punishment triggered can only be 
   2,   2,   1, which are consistent with the 
""{ .  
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as 
.29 Given the 
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, 0 0  0
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the maximal differentiation equilibrium; not surprisingly, for intermediate values, i.e. 
when both equilibria are sustainable, the effects depend on the punishment chosen.  
Therefore, once again, the relative magnitude of  will determine which 
punishment is triggered and therefore which is the effect of a further increase in c on 
the likelihood of collusion. An increase in the unit cost facilitates collusion when the 
punishment triggered is the minimal differentiation equilibrium but discourages it 
when the punishment triggered is the maximal differentiation equilibrium. 
When the punishment is the maximal differentiation equilibrium, collusion and 
defection profits are both decreasing functions of ; in fact, defection profits decrease 
more than collusion profits so that the one-time gain decreases. However, punishment 
profits are constant with respect to the unit cost: hence, the future loss decreases as 
well. The second effect offsets the first, and the overall impact is to discourage collusion. 
From (11), it is easy to check that the equilibrium cover price in one-shot competition 
is: 
∗ =  +  −  
Indirectly, the readers pay the whole production cost. On the other hand, when 
the publishers collude, they bear the production costs themselves and make the readers 
pay a price based on their reservation price. Accordingly, the publishers find collusion 
relatively less desirable in respect to competition when the unit cost increases. 
When instead the punishment triggered is the minimal differentiation 
equilibrium, an increase in the unit cost facilitates collusion. Collusion and defection 
profits decrease but the latter decrease more than the former; thus, the one-time gain 
from defection drops. Nevertheless, as the equilibrium cover prices are zero and all 
production costs are sustained by publishers, the punishment profits decrease by the 
same amount as the collusion profits.31 As a result, future losses are constant as unit 
costs change. To conclude, a marginal cost increase facilitates collusion because it 
makes defection less profitable with respect to collusion; in other words, coordination is 
easier. 
 
                                                        
31 One could easily note that the market is split in the middle in both cases and therefore the production 
costs are the same in the two cases. 
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3.4.2. Collusion on both prices and political position 
The critical discount factors when publishers collude on both prices and the political 
position are  
 
Punishment triggered Defection Critical discount factor 
Minimal differentiation equilibrium 
 ≥  + 25/72 
Defection type 1 
 ≥  −  + 25/16 
UX "qr 
Defection type 2 
 <  −  + 25/16 
UX 
qr 
Maximal differntiation equilibrium 
 ≤ c + t/2 
Defection type 1 
 ≥  −  + 25/16 
UX "qr 
Defection type 2 
 <  −  + 25/16 
UX 
qr 
Table 8 
 
where, recalling that UX = ** and substituting the relevant expressions for profits as 
a function of the parameters, 
 
UX "qr =
 −  + 1716  − 
 −  + 98  − 4
 
UX 
qr =
 −  + t16 −  +

2 s −  +
7
16  + t


 −  + 2 s −  +
7
16  + t

  
UX "qr =
1
2 
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UX 
qr =
 −  + t16 −  +

2 s −  +
7
16  + t


− + 2 s −  +
7
16  + t

  
 
In this case the study of the effect of an increase in the exogenous parameters on the 
critical discount factors are much more complex. As an example, we thus report only the 
effect of an increase in the dimension of the advertising market, which is the parameter 
most directly related to the two-sided nature of the market. 
 
  Effect on the critical discount factor 
Minimal 
differentiation 
Defection 
type 1 
Always positive 
Defection 
type 2 
• if	yH − FH + I H  − I > 0,	positive	∀G	admissible	
• if	yH − FH + I H  − I < 0 
negative	when					F +  £  H <  <  + IH − I H − y,positive	when									G ≥ F + IH − I H − y
	
Maximal 
differentiation 
Defection 
type 1 
None 
Defection 
type 2 
see next paragraph 
 
Table 1 
The critical discount factor associated with maximal differentiation and 
defection type 2 in the collusion-on-everything environment is the following: 
/ =  −  + 16 −  + 2 s −  + 716  + t


− + 2 s −  + 716  + t
 	
47 
 
This is a complicated function of : it can be upward or downward sloping in the 
interval in which the analysis applies to32 depending on the other parameters 
Though in theory possible, the conditions apply for very small ranges of the 
parameters. Accordingly, we decided not to take the study of the critical discount factor 
for this second type of defection (it would ambiguous and complicated to interpret 
anyway). 
Observing Table 5, we can see that in case the minimal differentiation 
equilibrium prevails, collusion is not favoured by the advertising market dimension, 
though the effect is controversial. Nonetheless, we can think the relationship is negative 
for most of the times since the subset of parameters for which collusion is actually 
favoured by the advertising market dimension selects intermediate values of ; what we 
are more interested in is the case in which  is high. 
About the maximal differentiation case we cannot say a lot: advertising does not 
affect collusion when the deviant would use a defection of type 1. 
3.5. Relocation costs and the form of collusion  
A possible weakness of the discussion above is represented by the assumption 
that publishers can change the political orientation of their newspapers at any 
repetition of the stage game without any time constraint and without incurring any cost. 
However, in reality, changing political orientations may in fact be more complicated 
than changing prices. A publisher wishing to move the newspaper from left to right 
might for instance need to substitute part of its left-wing journalists who are not ready 
to change their articles’ line. 
To obviate the issue, let us assume that every time a publisher changes her 
political orientation, she has to bear a non-negative sunk cost F, no matter how much it 
is changed or the direction of the change. This cost can well represent the expenses 
linked to the recruitment of new signatures and to marketing campaigns. The higher the 
sunk cost, the more difficult will be changing the political orientation with respect to 
                                                        
32 This interval is 
Q{  +  −  <  < 
Q"p  +  −  , 
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prices. Since it is a cost associated with relocation of the newspaper on the political line, 
we hereafter call it relocation cost. 
First of all, let us consider two extreme cases: in the first one the relocation cost 
is zero, in the second it is infinite. In fact the first case is represented by the model 
studied until now; instead, the second corresponds to a repeated Gabzsewicz, Laussel 
and Sonnac (2002) where locations are selected at the beginning of time, once forever. 
In this sense it is easy to note that the form of collusion on prices is the only one 
remaining in the second case (see Friedman and Thisse, 1979): no agreement on 
political orientations could arise since a defection at the very first step could not be 
punished. Furthermore, it can be easily derived that the final outcome and the defection 
strategy found for collusion on prices only and ¤ = 0 can apply in this new case with F 
infinite too.  
We should now consider the intermediate and more general case in which ¤ is 
finite and positive. Both forms of collusion can be sustained in theory and do not change 
their characteristics in terms of outcomes. However, the sustainability of collusion is 
now altered by the relocation cost: in some cases, punishment strategy implies 
relocation and therefore leads to different payoffs. Accordingly, sustainability of 
collusion should be analyzed looking at different critical discount factor. 
As usual, this critical discount factor depends on the kind of collusion and on the 
prevailing equilibrium. If locations change between collusion, defection and/or 
punishment, publishers pay a relocation cost. It is easy to notice that in one case, 
locations do not change: it is when publishers collude on prices only and the prevailing 
equilibrium is the minimal differentiation one. In all the other cases, locations change in 
the first punishment turn. The critical discount factor can be derived starting from the 
streams of payoffs associated with defection and cooperation. We found that 
cooperating is more likely if : 
¤U
 + ?T − ?P + ¤U + ?S − ?T ≥ 0 
UX = ?T − ?P + ¤ − ¥¤
 + ?T − ?P
 + ¤74?S − 2?T+?P82¤  
?T − ?P > ¤ 
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The last condition guarantees that the relocation cost is not so high to cover the 
benefits of defecting. If it actually does, the case is similar to the one with infinite 
relocation cost. 
Unsurprisingly, it can be shown that the critical discount factor decreases in F so 
that the bigger the	¤, the more likely is collusion, no matter which is the type of 
collusion. Accordingly, as long as ¤ is less than ?T − ?P , both kinds of collusion make 
sense, with collusion being more likely as ¤ grows. When F approaches ?T − ?P , only 
collusion on prices remains a possibility. 
4. Conclusions 
We analysed a newspaper market where two editors compete for advertising as 
well as for readers. They first choose the political position of their newspaper, then set 
cover prices and advertising tariffs.  
We built on the work of Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002), who show 
that advertising financing tends to reduce political differentiation among newspapers 
and can explain the ascent of the so-called Pensée Unique. This is more likely the larger 
the advertising market and therefore the larger the per reader revenues from 
advertising.  
We took their model as the stage game of an infinitely repeated game, and 
investigated the incentives to collude using grimm trigger strategies and the properties 
of the collusive agreements in terms of welfare and pluralism. 
As in Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002), newspapers are assumed to 
enjoy monopoly power over advertisers, who may multi-home, for access to their 
readers, who are instead assumed to single-home.  It is further assumed that readers 
are not affected by the quantity of advertising on the newspaper. We justify this 
assumption referring to the empirical literature on newspaper markets and, more 
generally, media markets. In such a situation there is in fact no gain from collusion on 
the advertising market. 
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We thus analysed and compared two types of collusion: in the first, publishers 
cooperatively select both prices and political position; in the second, publishers 
cooperatively select prices only.  
Whereas full collusion leads to intermediate product differentiation, collusion on 
prices only leads, as in Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002), to minimal 
product differentiation. However, in the latter case, differently from Gabszewicz, 
Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002), cover prices are positive and the minimal 
differentiation outcome does not depend on the size of the advertising market. So that 
collusion on prices reinforces the tendency towards a Pensée Unique discussed in 
Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001). Indeed, if advertising revenues are so low that 
maximal differentiation would be the competitive outcome, the higher they are the 
more likely is collusion. Yet we also showed that, whenever advertising revenues are so 
high that minimum differentiation arises as a competitive equilibrium,   then the higher 
advertising revenues the less likely is collusion.  
Our analysis shows that despite the two-sided nature of the market the more 
competition there is the better it is for consumers. In particular, competition yields 
higher welfare than collusion on prices only, which in turn outperforms collusion on 
both prices and the political position of newspapers. Note that this is true even if we 
assumed the market to be covered.  Despite this assumption, no gain in the readers’ 
welfare due to relocation of newspapers in the political spectrum is large enough to 
offset the price increase.  
From a total welfare point of view instead, when the competitive outcome is the 
minimal differentiation equilibrium, i.e. when the advertising market is very large and 
the per-reader advertising revenues are high: 
- a collusive agreement on prices and locations decreases consumers’ welfare 
while increasing total welfare; the reason is that newspapers chose locations that 
minimize the sum of the political costs sustained by all readers but then extract all the 
extra surplus of readers through higher prices. 
- a collusive agreement on prices only brings about no consequences for total 
welfare but harms consumers, because prices increase while locations remain constant, 
so only a redistribution of surplus takes place.  
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Similarly, when the competitive outcome is the maximal differentiation 
equilibrium, i.e. when the advertising market is small and per-reader advertising 
revenues are low: 
- both forms of collusion harm consumers;  
- but total welfare can increase or decrease, depending on the parameters; in 
particular, whatever the form of collusion, total welfare is likely to decrease the lower 
the ratio of the advertising market parameter k to the political sensitiveness of the 
readers t.  
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Appendix A. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof consists of threes different stages: a) finding 
the best defection strategy in case the location is shifted from ¼; b) finding the best 
defection strategy keeping location fixed at ¼; c) comparing the two defection strategies 
to find the overall optimal one. 
a) When a publisher defects at the location step, the other publisher punishes 
from the subsequent step on; as a result, in the defection turn the deviant selects a 
location different from ¼ while the other one actually plays ¼ and they play a Nash 
equilibrium in prices given locations at the second step. If the Nash equilibria are 
unique, when choosing the location the deviant knows which Nash equilibrium will 
follow in the second step; in other words, she will select the preferred Nash equilibrium. 
First of all, it is necessary to find the Nash equilibria given the pair of political 
orientations ,¼. Following Gabsewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2002) and starting from 
the profit function in (8), we can find the best prices of publisher 1 and 2 respectively: 
" = max g0, 12  −  + 
 + 916  − 
¦																																							32 

 = max g0, 12  −  + " + 1516  − 2 + 
¦																																		33 
By substitution we can find Nash equilibria in prices. The non-negativity 
constraint on price levels leads us to four regions, as in Gabzewicz, Laussel and Sonnac 
(2002). 
Region 1.  
" =  −  + 1132  − 13 − 16
																																																					34 

 =  −  + 1332  − 23 − 16
																																																					35 
Region 2. 
" = 12 M −  + 916  − 
N																																																									36 

 = 0																																																																																37 
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Region 3. 
" = 0																																																																																38 

 = 12 M −  + 1516  − 2 + 
N																																																					39 
Region 4. 
" = 0																																																																																40 

 = 0																																																																																41 
One should notice that newspaper demands in (4) and (5) and so the profit 
function in (8) assume that publisher 1 is located on the left hand side of publisher 2; 
accordingly, the four regions apply in 0 ≤  ≤ {. On the other hand, publisher 1 would 
never locate in the interval  
{ <  ≤ 1 since she would be located in the smaller segment 
of the political spectrum. 
The four regions are admissible for the following sets of parameters: 
- If  > , only Region 1 is admissible. 
- If  >  and 
• 0 <  ≤ 
"  −   
 only Region 4 is admissible in 70, {8 
•  

"  −  <  ≤ 
""  −  
 Region 3 is admissible for 0 ≤  < " 
 Region 4 is admissible for " ≤  ≤ 3/4 
• 

""  −  <  ≤ 4 −  
 Region 1 is admissible for 0 ≤  < 
 
 Region 3 is admissible for 
 ≤  < " 
 Region 4 is admissible for " ≤  < 3/4 
•  > 4 −  
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 Region 1 is admissible for 0 ≤  < " 
 Region 2 is admissible for " ≤  < 
 
 Region 4 is admissible for 
 ≤  ≤ 3/4 
Let us note that 
" = 2 − 14w96  −  + 25 

 = −1 + 14w96  −  + 49 
Once the Nash equilibria are fully characterized, we can go backwards to the first 
step and find the best location possible. Therefore, we should find the maximum of the 
profit function for every possible set of parameters; first of all, it is useful to inspect the 
sign of the derivative of the profits with respect to location  in every possible region. 
We find that 
In Region 1 
h?h < 0								when	applicable 
In Region 2: this region is meaningful if  > 4 −  and " ≤  < 
 
If  4 −  ≤  < QR§  − , 	¨¨- > 0		∀ ∈ 7", 
 
If  
QR§  −  ≤  < R

"RR  − , |
¨¨- > 0		∀ ∈ 7", ¨¨- < 0		∀ ∈ , 
  
where		 = 12 − 14√3w16 −  + 3 
If  ≥ R

"RR  − ,  ¨¨- < 0		∀ ∈ 7", 
 
In Region 3 
h?h > 0								when	applicable 
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In Region 4 
h?h > 0								when	applicable 
It is therefore easy to see that the critical points are   0,  = 3/4 and  = . 
After calculating the profits made by the deviant publisher in the critical points and 
checking which of them is actually optimal in any possible subset of parameters, we can 
conclude that the optimal defection strategy consists of selecting 
 = 0									if	 > 	ª( > 	« > 2885 ( − )) 
 = 34 								if	 > 	«0 < ≤ 2885 ( − ) 
at the first step of the turn and then applying the Nash equilibrium strategy in 
the prices step.  
Let us name ?( = 0) the profits made by the deviant in the defection turn when 
she selects  = 0 in the first step, and ?( = 3/4 the profits made by the deviant in the 
defection turn when she selects  = 3/4 in the first step. These profits do not include 
the relocation cost F paid due to shifting location from ¼ to 0 or to ¾. In fact, the payoffs 
would be ? = 0 − ¤ and ? = 3/4 − ¤ respectively. However, we can pursue the 
demonstration as if there was no relocation cost. The reason will be clear shortly. 
? = 0 = 55384  
? = 3/4 = 34  −  
b) Optimal defection with location fixed at ¼ is easier to obtain since it simply 
consists of finding a defection price for the second step of the stage game. To sum up, 
the pair of locations is fixed at (1/4,1/4) and the non-deviant publisher applies a price 
equal to  − ,"p. The deviant publisher maximizes the profits in the price.  
By maximising the profits in (8) with	respect	to	" with   "{ ,  = "{ 	and	
 = − ,"p	, we obtain that 
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1			h?h > 0		for		 < 12 M +  −  + 716 N 
2			h?h < 0		for		 > 12 M +  −  + 716 N 
3			h?h = 0		for		 = 12 M +  −  + 716 N 
Therefore, the best price is 
"∗ = 12 M +  −  + 716 N																																																	42 
Nevertheless, it should be noticed that this best price is meaningful as long as it 
implies a total demand lower than 1. When defecting, the deviant publisher gets part of 
the demand of the non-deviant publisher; if she gets all the demand of the other, her 
demand will be 1 and any smaller price would not imply more demand. It is easy to 
check that the threshold price is 
 =  − 916 																																																																43 
for which the deviant’s demand is exactly 1. There is no reason why the 
publisher should make any lower price; hence, if the price in (42) is smaller than the 
threshold price in (43), the best price is the threshold price itself. The following 
condition summarizes the fact and gives the expression of the optimal defection 
strategy for this case: 
"∗ = 12 M +  −  + 716 N 			if				 ≤  −  + 2516 																										(44) 
"∗ =  −
9
16 						if				 >  −  +
25
16 																																							(45) 
Let us name profits made applying the best price in (44) ?(x) and profits made 
with the best price in (45) ?(̅). 
?(x) =
( +  −  + 716 )


4  
?(̅) =  − 916  +  − 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c) We have now to compare profits made in the two alternative defections. In 
other words, we have to compare ?x and ?̅ with ? = 0 and ? = 3/4. 
It is easy to check that in every possible subset of parameters, ?x and ?̅ are 
higher than ? = 0 and ? = 3/4 respectively. 
Proof of Lemma 4. We can start analysing the second and third case of 
Definition 3. The demonstration is parallel and will be given for case 2 only. When this is 
the case, the consumer located at 0 is the reservation price consumer: for the market to 
be entirely covered in any different state with a, b given, p" ≤ u − ta
. For any p" < u − ta
, the state can be improved for Proposition 1 (it is not a touch state 
anymore). Therefore, only p
 can be modified: it cannot be decreased because with p" 
fixed at u − ta
 for the just mentioned reasons, this would lead to a decrease in 
publisher 1’s profits; it can be increased on condition that publisher 2’s profits increase. 
In fact, in this case publisher 1’s profits would increase. With a, b given and p" = u − ta
, publisher 2’s profits can be written as 
π
 = p
 + k − c k1 + b − a2 + u − ta
 − p
2t1 − a − bl. 
Deriving such function on 
, we find h?
h
 =  −  − 2
 +  − 2 − 

 + 21 −  −   
We can check that this derivative is negative for p
 = u − ta
 and therefore 
increasing p
 would lead to decrease publisher 2’s profits. Consequently, no change in 
prices can make any publisher better off without making the other publisher worse off 
for case 2. 
In case 1, the reservation price consumer is located in the middle between a	and	1 − b; this means that any different price pair has to set the consumer on y to be 
the reservation price consumer; otherwise, either the market is not covered, or the state 
is not a touch state and can be improved. The new price pair has so to satisfy the 
following 
g p" = u − ty − a
p
 = u − t1 − y − b
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If you give y, the new price pair is given as above in (33). Accordingly, profits can 
be rewritten as 
g ?" =  − ! − 
 +  − !?
 =  − 1 − ! − 
 +  − 1 − ! 
Deriving such profits functions on y, we obtain: 
$%&
%' h?"h! = − +  − 
 +  + 4! − 3!
h?
h! =  −  + 3 − 4 + 
 −  − 6! + 4! + 3!

 
We can check that with ! = "®-*.
  
$%&
%'h?"h! > 0h?
h! < 0
 
Therefore, it is not possible to increase one’s profits without decreasing the 
other one’s profits. As a consequence, the best same-price-rule is optimal, i.e. selects 
Pareto optima only. 
To conclude, the publishers agree to follow this pricing rule at any second stage 
every turn when they are allowed to collude on prices only. Going backward, at the first 
stage they take into account this rule in order to select the optimal location. As a result, 
we can investigate a Nash equilibrium outcome for the stage game in order to fully 
characterize the collusion outcome.  
Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that ≤ 1 − b . This does not mean 
that, for example, publisher 1 cannot select a location on the right hand side of publisher 
2’s one, but only that when she does it, she can be thought to have changed his profits to 
that of publisher 2. 
 Before moving to equilibrium behaviour, it is important to note that each case 
identifies a different region on 70,18 × 70,18 when a ≤ 1 − b, a, b ∈ 70,18 × 70,18.  
To do this, we firstly derive the profit functions for every of the three regions 
identified by the three cases of Definition 3: 
                                                        
33 In fact, the starting price pair verifies the condition and represents the case of ! = "®-*.
 . 
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region	1)							
?" = s − 4 (1 −  − )

 +  − t (1 +  − 2 )
?
 = s − 4 (1 −  − )
 +  − t (
1 −  + 
2 )
																				(44) 
region	2)							
?" = ( − 
 +  − )(1 +  − 2 )
?
 = ( − 
 +  − )(1 −  + 2 )
																																		(45) 
region	3)							
?" = ( − 
 +  − )(1 +  − 2 )
?
 = ( − 
 +  − )(1 −  + 2 )
																																		(46) 
Given this set of profits functions depending on locations only, equilibrium 
behaviour is easily derived for publisher 1. Given symmetry, the same result holds for 
publisher 2. It can be shown that given b, deriving the profits functions in (44), (45) and 
(46) on a	and comparing the results with the set of parameters compatible with the 
model and with the respective set of variables represented by each region as in (22), 
(23) and (24) results in: 
							∂π"∂a > 0				and 			
∂π

∂b > 0,			∀(a, b) ∈ 70,18 × 70,18,	with a ≤ 1 − b												(47) 
Therefore the rule only selects Pareto optima. QED. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The expression in (27) implies that publisher 1, given 
an expectation of publisher 2’s location b, whatever the region is, tends to locate at 
1 − b because it is the maximum value of a compatible with the limit a ≤ 1 − b; the 
same can be said for publisher 2: she tends to locate at 1 − a. This behaviour derives 
from the fact that setting a common price at the second stage of the game implies the 
split of the demand between a	and	1 − b in two equal parts: moving towards the other’s 
location, each publisher gains demand; this is a common outcome when the prices are 
fixed (beach). This happens in every region and in particular, between the regions so 
that publishers face the same incentives moving their location towards the one of the 
other publisher. 
Every pair of locations (a, 1 − a) (or (1 − b, b), that is the same), is a Nash 
equilibrium candidate. Only (1/2,1/2) is left when we consider that when the publisher 
1 locate in 1 − b, she faces the incentive to jump on the other side of the 1 − b if 
1 − b < 1/2; indeed, given the demand function when the publishers locate at the same 
point of the unit interval, publisher 1 takes the demand on the left hand side of the point 
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while publisher 2 takes the demand on the right hand side. The symmetric incentive is 
faced by publisher 2 when 1 − a < 1/2. Therefore, the publishers can expect the exact 
location of the other only locating in the middle of the unit interval. QED. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The best reply to 1/2, u − t/4 can be found taking the 
profit function of publisher 1 when publisher 2 plays such strategy, deriving firstly on 
the price and then on the location taking into account the optimal price. 
First, the profit function from (8) can be found for b, p
 	= s"
 , u − ±{t ;	if we take  
nx = a2	+	14 	+	u −
t4 − p"2t s12 − at 																																																						48 
we obtain: 
π" =
$%&
%' 0, nx < 0p" + k − c²a2	+	14 	+	u −
t4 − p"2t s12 − at³ , 0 ≤ nx ≤ 1p" + k − c, nx > 1
 														49 
Deriving (42) on p"we find that: 
∂π"∂p" = 
0, nx < 0c − k − 2p" − a
t + ut − 2at , 0 ≤ nx ≤ 11, nx > 1  																									50 
We can analyse the optimal behaviour in the sub-interval ´0, "
µ; indeed, the 
optimal behaviour in the subinterval ´"
 , 1µ is exactly specular to the former. 
As long as the demand of newspapers is between 0 and 1 (second row in (49) 
and (50)), publisher 1 chooses an optimal price equal to: 
px"∗ = c − k − a
t + u2 																																																					51 
It is important to observe that 
¶·¸+∗¶ < 0 in the entire unit interval, except 1/2. 
This pricing rule is valid as long as the demand of newspapers is between 0 and 
1. Indeed, recalling (49) with p" = px"∗ , we can easily obtain that: 
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0 ≤ nx ≤ 1		if and only if a ∈ 70, a8,	where a = 2t − √−ct + kt + 2t
 + tut 				52 
We can also obtain that:  
0 ≤ a < 1/2																																																																				53 
Using px"∗  as pricing rule, publisher 1 chooses the best location ax∗ deriving the 
profit function on a; we obtain that: 
∂π"∂a > 0, ∀ ∈ 70, a8																																																								54 
As explained in Proposition 5 for a similar case, (54) makes sense as long as the 
pricing in (51) leads to a demand between 0 and 1. 
Therefore, for a ∈ ´a, "
µ, the pricing px"∗  leads to a demand equal to 1 for which this 
pricing is not optimal anymore: as can be seen from the third row of (43), in this case 
the publisher optimally selects the highest price possible. We can start identifying the 
price for which the demand is exactly 1 for a ∈ ´a, "
t: p"∗ = u − t1 − a
																																																																55 
It is easy to observe that any lower price will bring lower profits and hence is not 
optimal. Any higher price does not guarantee demand equal to 1: in this case we can 
check from (28) and (29) that profits increase when p decreases. As a consequence, p"∗  
is the optimal pricing for a ∈ 7a, 1/28. Using p"∗  as pricing rule we can check that  ∂π"∂a > 0, ∀ ∈ ¹a, 12N																																																								56 
Summarizing results in (44) and (56), 
∂π"∂a |> 0,									∀ ∈ 70, a> 0, ∀ ∈ ¹a, 12N 				                                              							57 
It remains to see what happens when a = 1/2; here the pricing p"∗  leads exactly 
to the collusion strategy where demand for publisher 1 is ½ while the pricing px"∗  leads 
to a demand equal to 1 for which px"∗  is not optimal.  
In fact, with a = 1/2 publisher 1 locates at the same point as publisher 2 or, from 
a different perspective, she does not differentiate her product: in this framework 
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publisher 1 takes the whole market simply applying a price slightly lower than the price 
applied by publisher 2, in this case equal to p
 = u − ±{.  
We can now compare this result with the one in (57): this hints that publisher 1 
is incentivized to locate as close as possible to ½ applying a price that sets the consumer 
in 1 to utility 0; such pricing would lead to a higher price in a = ½, but the relative 
demand there would be ½ only because publisher 2 is located at the same point and 
applies the same price. As just observed, here publisher 1 optimally applies a slightly 
lower price. Therefore, publisher 1’s optimal defection strategy consists of  = 1/2 and 
 =  − ,{ − », with » > 0, 9	small as wanted. QED. 
 
